Contemporary theorists of constituent power recognise a tension in which the omnipotent novelty of constituent power is necessarily policed by constituted power. Beginning with Arendt's claim that the categories of constitutional stability and political novelty should be thought together rather than treated as oppositional, this article presents an interpretation of her work that seeks to address this 'paradox of constitutionalism'. Whilst commentators have come to assert that Arendt repudiates 'absolutes' in favour of an account of 'relative beginnings', this article demonstrates that Arendt's argument involves a critical redescription of the absolute, rather than a repudiation. This is significant, for it illuminates the manner in which her account of founding seeks to dismantle the commonplace temporalisations we attribute to our political vocabulary. This is employed to argue that particular stylings of absolutes naturalise the appearance of the new only as temporal ruptures, allowing us to get a handle upon the paradox of constitutionalism, and to think tentatively beyond this paradigm.
against ' . 29 Stability and novelty are agonistically related in a precarious, open-ended struggle between politicisation and depoliticisation. 30 Though the opposition is transformed into a generative tension, stability nevertheless remains antithetical to the spirit of the new.
More recent revisionary interpretations of On Revolution have challenged Honig's breakthrough reading. Andreas Kalyvas takes Honig's reading to task, instead arguing that
Arendt celebrates the American revolutionaries who were able 'to avoid the language and practices of absolute rupture' that a purely performative politics entails, for they relied upon pre-existing contracts, charters and self-governing public bodies, thus escaping the 'lawlessness and power vacuum that a complete break would have necessarily created'. 31 Through the 'relative' nature of beginning in On Revolution, he argues, Arendt's story of the American founding drew its strength from the ability to remain in continuity with the preceding democratic culture of the colonies.
While this was an instance of 'extraordinary politics', no absolute beginning arose for authority was derived from the legal traditions and institutions that persisted. Though Kalyvas's interpretation offers the critical insight that a thread of temporal continuity remains, this is styled as a legal continuity in order to avoid the proximity to Carl Schmitt by 'repudiating the notion of an ex nihilo beginning'. 32 There is certainly good reason to think Arendt is replying to Schmitt, 33 though this need not be so straightforward as a repudiation of absolutes, and the inversion of Schmitt's argument. To suggest this is the case is troublesome for it tempers the manner in which
Arendt rethinks the significance of law. For Kalyvas, the appropriate action is to take guidance from existing laws, and not to throw oneself into the abyss of freedom. A relative beginning ensures that the absolute does not emerge, but only in this instance, a position enhanced by his emphasis upon the exceptionally good laws of colonial American. The absolute, as the spectre of a Schmittian conception of commandment, remains conspicuous in its absence, for it is excluded from the particular case though not overcome generally, and so Kalyvas's thesis retains the phenomenological makeup that associates law with stability, and politics with the new, though a new inflected with decisionism. To escape this decisionism, the novelty of politics is subordinated pg. 9 of 36 to the law through which it is harnessed and contained. 34 Rather than an antagonistic relation, or an agonistic struggle, politics is inscribed within the law though the distinctive conceptual functions of each are retained. Wenman reads Arendt as opening up an abyss of freedom, he suggests she does so only by radically rupturing the historical time continuum. Though he appreciates the phenomenological importance of the act of founding, the insightful distinction that he sketches between constituent power as revolution and augmentation, along with his preference for the former, urges us to engage in a politics that does not concede to the closure of law. In order to do so he styles this rupture in the form of a messianic break. 38 That is to say, for Wenman theologico-political absolutes are necessary to overcome the law and mobilise the brand of militant cosmopolitanism he demands.
None of this is intended to diminish the innovation of their readings, for the positions of Wenman, Honig and Kalyvas strike upon crucial elements of Arendt's thought, though I wish to emphasise that in utilising absolutes as theologico-political tools, they are encouraged to think of law and politics as opposed categories, and so cannot get a handle upon a complementary relation between novelty and stability. In the process of doing so, the temporal experience of founding is drawn in one of three ways; it is either a continuity with the past, a radical break from it, or an pg. 10 of 36 agonistic struggle against the despotic though stabilizing absolute. Each of these readings lead us back into the paradox of constitutionalism, for the temporal lens through which they approach founding associates constituent power's novelty with a political break, and stability of constituted power with continuity.
OF RELATIVE ABSOLUTES
The term 'absolute' plays a far more distinguished role in Arendt's account of constitutional founding than has thus far been acknowledged. In attending to it, we can appreciate that it is precisely this common distinction, which maps continuity on to stability and associates rupture with radicality, that Arendt reworks. In addition to these theologico-political uses, there is another 'absolute' which conceives of temporality of founding differently. Here, Arendt establishes the grounds for a peculiar construction she refers to as 'relatively absolute spontaneity', which she employs to critically rewrite the valence of the term 'absolute' in order to reintegrate it into her political vocabulary by scrambling the terms of temporal experience in modern Western thought that bind novelty to futurity and rupture. This appropriately frames her characterisation of the absolute as it applies to the establishment of principles in and of politics. The purpose of this is to undo what both Honig and Kalyvas, in their own ways, take to be the despotic moment of the absolute that places the law above and against politics. This oblique argument can be discerned if one first appreciates that through her often experimental and eclectic writing the meaning and valence of words such as 'authority', 'foundation' and 'absolute' shift radically. She exploits this strategy of reading as a means of disrupting the commonplace distinctions that the political vocabularies of the 'Western tradition' attribute to absolutes.
As a way into this disruption of our temporal register, Arendt considers Kant's 'embarrassment' in dealing with the problem of bringing something new into a world already in motion. There is an apparent tension in which Kant describes a chain of causation beginning in the moment he rises from his chair. In doing so, she quotes Kant, a new series has 'an absolute pg. 11 of 36 beginning in this event, although as regards time this event is only the continuation of a preceding series'. 39 What is 'so very troublesome' is the 'notion of an absolute beginning, for "a series occurring in the world can have only a relatively first beginning, being always preceded by some other state of things"'. 40 This is to suggest a perplexing tension is in place between the act being at once relative and absolute. In rising from a chair, the act can be said to be an 'absolute beginning' insofar as causality is concerned, if not time, for though time does not begin anew, something new is initiated in willing that act. Despite this, due to our received relation between causation and temporality,
it is not at all straightforward whether such a beginning can be interpreted as an 'absolute beginning'. Kalyvas has taken this passage to indicate a reproach on Arendt's behalf of Kant's failure to distinguish absolute from relative beginnings, in order to affirm his interpretation of her as a theorist of the latter. 41 This, however, seems to paper over precisely the temporal difficulty at stake, for she does not turn to Kant in order to resolve the problem of willing, but to prise it open.
It is certainly the case that humans cannot commence time anew as if they were gods though it diminishes the thrust of Arendt's account of the will and of action, each with their 'miraculous' qualities, 42 if the beginning is treated as only relatively new. The discussion points to something more profound. The manner in which we take for granted the appearance of the new within politics does not so much conflate temporality with causation, but privileges the former over the latter. Our common sense dictates that the absolutely new is not only unprecedented, but that it attains its unprecedented significance by appearing ex nihilo, and so a problem follows: the absolutely new may only emerge as an event unconnected with the past, an activity that, short of an arrogative gesture to the tools of political theology, is beyond the scope of human action. In doing so, it also naturalises the phenomenological opposition between novelty and stability, in which the absolutely new appears only as a punctuated temporal break that, insofar as is it is to be perceived as an absolutely new event, must break from that which existed before.
Rejecting the absolutely new in favour of a relative beginning does little to address this naturalised opposition. It is, however, possible to identify an attempt on Arendt's behalf to pg. 12 of 36 redescribe the temporality and valence of an absolute beginning in order to square this difficulty.
In Augustine, she finds a distinction between two beginnings, the principium of heaven and earth, and the initium of humankind, a distinction that points to the phenomenon that Kant draws between those temporally absolute and relative beginnings. 43 Arendt returned to this distinction often throughout her body of work, and the employment is significant for not only does she consider him the only philosopher who, through this distinction, adequately explains Genesis in a manner sensitive to the human capacities to begin, but in doing so he sufficiently complicated the relation between what we take to be relative and absolute beginnings. Though principium amounted to the beginning of the world and time, time only became meaningful through the initium of humankind without whom the movement of time was unthinkable. Prior to the creation of humankind, time turned in a 'purposeless way', and so it was for the 'sake of novitas…that man was created'.
pg. 15 of 36
There is a spatializing phenomenology of law that proceeds from this. Through the lens of principium, the beginning of law serves as a partitioning device that commences time and space, with the explicit purposes of securing the inside from the out and reducing politics to peace, an ability amplified by the command-authority emanating from the 'power monopoly of the state', itself an imitation of the divine creator who prohibits human actions through commandment.
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The lens of initium, in conceiving of beginnings as activities sensitive to human plurality, conceptualises law differently. Insofar as the beginning is not conceived as a radically punctuated rupture in time and space, but an activity within time that is inaugurated and augmented, the creation of law serves not as a wall to separate one from another, but, in accordance with the Roman Lex, seeks formal relationships and ties between individuals. 59 To this effect, Law served as a means of forging an alliance or rapport to relate things, in order to bring individuals face-toface. 60 The spatial inflection of this is to see Lex not as the preservation of a space, but the reduction of distance between individuals in order to foster political interaction and forge a common world.
The correlated effect is to conceive law alongside politics as complementary tools that augment the founding act. 61 That is to say, the implication of the temporality associated with the relatively absolute beginning of initium is to alter one's relation to law. Politics is not a disposition of beingagainst the law, nor does Arendt contrast constituent with constituted power. This conceptual nesting is the legacy of interpreting the absolute beginning as principium.
BEYOND THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE TEMPORALITY OF THE RELATIVE ABSOLUTE
The overlooked, and relatively finely-tuned difference over the temporality Arendt associates with the term absolute is not only thoroughly relevant to her own account of political founding, but also allows us to get a handle upon the phenomenological make-up of the paradox of constitutionalism. Doing so appropriately situates her response in a manner that devises an account of founding that reconciles stability with the emergence of the new by disrupting our Hannah Arendt, the Problem of the Absolute and the Paradox of Constitutionalism pg. 16 of 36 common-sense temporalisations of these categories. Loughlin and Walker's paradox of constitutionalism presents the elementary tension of modern constitutionalism in the relation between the people as constituent power and the constitutional form that they bring into being.
The unconditionally generative constituent power of the people must, for it to successfully establish a constitutional regime, be 'divided' and 'constrained' through the instituting act. 62 To frame the problem differently, constitutionalism appears paradoxical for it relates constituted power to the stability associated with legality and continuity, and constituent power with the familiar temporal clustering of law, stability and continuity in order to temper the unruly constituent power. 64 The stability ensured by legal continuity is necessary so long as the activity of constituent power is conceived through the lens of a theologico-political absolute. The corollary is that the elementary bracketing between stability and the new remains intact. Though this may provide a viable constitutional form, its solution to the paradox of constitutionalism is to invert the bifurcation through which stability is given preference over novelty in even the first instance.
This diagnostic point demonstrates that it is not enough simply to reject or resists the concept of the absolute when conceiving of the activity of founding. So long as we associate the absolute beginning with temporal rupture-one that is imitative of the divine creation of the world-our vocabulary fosters conceptual bifurcations and 'automatic thought-reactions' that Arendt wished to do away with, bracketing off stability against novelty, by pairing them with continuity and rupture respectively. 65 Practically, moreover, it only allows the radically new to appear in predictable ways, namely, as a break from the past. Arendt's solution, at least by The Life of the Mind, is not an endorsement of 'relative' beginnings, for she would be led back into the problem.
It is the notion of relatively absolute spontaneity that allows her to reconsider this. If it is to allow us to conceive of stability and novelty together, however, the temporal structure of this activity requires discerning. In reading her account of the temporality of the thinking ego against the temporality of action, a 'relatively absolute' beginning within time springs from creative reflection on the past, displacing assumptions of linear continuity that associate the new with rupture. This elaborates the finer points of difference between my interpretation of Arendt and Kalyvas's 'relative beginnings' thesis in order to demonstrate how this temporality can be put to work to reconsider the terms of paradox of constitutionalism.
Toward the end of Thinking, Arendt returns to a parable by Kafka entitled 'He'. 66 Here she envisions the location of the thinking ego upon a 'battleground' between the forces of past and future. That they are 'forces' is pivotal to her conceptualisation of temporality, for each of them presses upon the mind in order to shape the world of the thinker. Passively, it is within this pg. 25 of 36 hominem temporalem is that time is conceivable only in our presence. Arendt's brilliant conclusion to this was to recognise the priority of the Augustinian initium over principium; correspondingly, beginnings are meaningful only in our reception of them. The important conclusion that follows is that we are not held captive by the picture of the theologico-political absolute, for though our whole vocabulary is shot through with temporal aspects we nevertheless have the capacity to rethink the manner in which temporality weighs upon our actions. Part three of this paper examined one way in which Arendt achieves this, through which the absolutely new event of initium emerges from the interface between thinking and acting that creatively draws from the past and projects into the future, one that is attentive and responsive to the world. This relatively absolute modality of founding is not only characterised by a reflexive formulation of the will, but also the political will's relationship with law. In forgoing the aspects of division that are carried over from the account of principium, 
